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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - INFORMATION SUPPLIED
BY AN ANONYMOUS INFORMER MUST BE CORROBO-
RATED BY ESTABLISHING THAT THE LAW IS BEING
VIOLATED TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SEARCH OR ARREST WITHOUT A WAR-
RANT; VERIFICATION OF OTHER INFORMATION IS
INSUFFICIENT CORROBORATION. People v. Reeves (Cal.
1964).
Inspector Martin, an experienced officer attached to the police
narcotics detail, received a telephone call from an anonymous fe-
male informer with whom no previous police contact had been made.
She told him that two 'narcotic losers' (persons previously convicted
of narcotic offenses) named Reeves, staying at the King George
Hotel, and McDonald, who operated an auto agency on Van Ness
Avenue, were in possession of marijuana.
Inspector Martin knew Reeves, and had talked with him during
the course of a prior narcotics investigation which had not resulted
in criminal charges. During this previous conversation with Reeves,
Martin had discovered that Reeves had been convicted of a narcotics
offense in Texas. Martin, knowing nothing of McDonald, had the
records searched and discovered that he had been convicted by a
federal court of a narcotic violation. He also corroborated the fact
that McDonald operated an automobile agency on Van Ness Avenue,
Martin proceeded to the automobile agency without a warrant,
searched McDonald, and found marijuana on his person. McDonald
admitted receiving the narcotic from Reeves. Without obtaining a
warrant Martin then proceeded to the hotel where Reeves was stay-
ing, gained entry into his room by a ruse, found marijuana, and
arrested Reeves.1
During Reeves' trial Martin testified that McDonald was not pro-
secuted for possession of marijuana because of a search and seizure
problem. The court held that the prosecution had failed to sustain
the burden of showing proper justification for searching McDonald,
and that therefore the evidence secured by the search was illegal.
With the exclusion of this evidence there was insufficient corrobora-
tion of the information received from the anonymous informer to
constitute reasonable cause to search or arrest. The search of Reeves
was therefore illegal, and, as a result, all the evidence obtained by
the search was inadmissible. People v. Reeves, 61 Cal. 2d 268, 391
P.2d 393, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1, (1964).
I Possession of marijuana is a violation of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
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Since the case of People v. Cahan2 illegally seized evidence has
been inadmissible in California.' If reasonable cause for search and
seizure does not exist, the search and seizure are illegal, and all in-
formation obtained as a result thereof is not admissible in evidence.
This rule has caused considerable controversy and confusion as to
what constitutes reasonable or probable cause. The courts are in
agreement only in that there is no exact formula for the determina-
tion of reasonable cause, and that each case must be decided on its
own facts and circumstances.' In making this determination the
applicable test has been, "[Clonsidering all the information in the
hands of the police, would a reasonable police officer 'Act on that
information or would a reasonable police officer seek further infor-
mation before making the arrest and conducting the search." 5
Information obtained from an informer may constitute grounds
for reasonable cause under certain conditions. Information from a
reliable informer can of itself constitute sufficient reasonable cause.6
A reliable informer is one whose information has in the past led the
police to valid suspects.' One who has not previously furnished such
information to the police cannot be considered reliable in the ab-
sence of a pressing emergency, and his information alone cannot be
a sufficient basis for a lawful search.' However, information ob-
tained from an untested informer may constitute grounds for rea-
sonable cause if evidence is presented to the court justifying the
conclusion that reliance on the information was reasonable.'
In the Reeves case several factors were considered in connection
with the problem of reasonable cause. Justice Peters, speaking for
the majority, said that the use of ruse or trickery to persuade Reeves
to open the door rendered the evidence obtained in the room inad-
missible because no reasonable cause existed prior to the employment
of such ruse. The prosecution failed to sustain its burden of showing
2 44 Cal. 2d 434, 283 P.2d 905 (1955).
3 This is not a mere technical rule of evidence. It is required to give substance to
the rights conferred by the state and federal constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend.
IV, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19, People v. Cahan, supra note 2.
4 E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.
2d 407, 412, 348 P.2d 577, 580 (1960).
5 People v. Diggs, 161 Cal. App. 2d 167, 171, 326 P.2d 194, 196 (1958).
6 People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 337, 341 P.2d 1, 4 (1959), 33 So. CAL. L.
R v. 208 (1960), 7. U.C.L.A.L. REV. 524 (1960); People v. Boyles, 45 Cal. 2d
652, 290 P.2d 535 (1955).
7 People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 119, 128, 310 P.2d 162, 168 (1957).
8 Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294 P.2d 36 (1956) ; People v. Amos,
181 Cal. App. 2d 506, 5 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1960). This rule is not limited to
anonymous informers. It is applicable to any person who has not gained the status
of a reliable informer. See note 26 infra for an example of an unreliable informer
whose identity was known to the police.
9 Willson v. Superior Court, supra note 8, at 294, 294 P.2d at 38.
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justification for the search of McDonald."0 Hence, no reliance could
be placed on it as a basis for Reeves' arrest and the search of his
room.1 It is apparent that the court believed that the first link in
the chain of events, i.e., sufficient corroboration of the anonymous
informer, was too weak to support a finding of reasonable cause.
Justice Peters formulated the necessary requirement for corrobora-
tion of an untested informer in the following terms: "[W]hile it
[the verification of names, addresses and records by the officer]
amounted to corroboration of that same information given by the
anonymous informer, it was not corroboration of the essential fact,
as to whether the two named men were now violating the law."'"
(Emphasis added.) The court found that the investigation by the
police merely corroborated the fact that the informer knew the
names and addresses of the two men and that they had prior nar-
cotic convictions. There was no corroboration of the alleged viola-
tion of the law.
Justice McComb, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Schauer
concurred, agreed that the information obtained from an anonymous
informer must be corroborated. He stated:
Information from an anonymous source can be sufficient probable
cause, however, if it is corroborated by other facts, sources, or cir-
cumstances that would justify reliance on it. . . . Although no
single fact may justify an arrest, a combination or concurrence of
facts may well do so.13 (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the dissent disagreed with the majority's refusal to use
the statement of McDonald as a corroborative fact, and stated that
probable cause
... is not limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial on
the issue of guilt. The test is not whether the evidence upon which
an officer acts in making the arrest is sufficient to convict but only
whether the person should stand trial. 14
The dissent further stated that every fact supplied by the informer,
with the exception of Reeves' possession of marijuana, had been
verified or corroborated, that the investigating officer had pre-exist-
ing information from which to determine that part of the anony-
mous information was reliable, and that McDonald's statement that
he received the narcotic from Reeves was more than a verification
of the information received from the anonymous informer; it was
10 The burden was on the prosecution to show proper justification for the arrest and
search of McDonald. People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 388 P.2d 665 (1964).
1 61 Cal. 2d at 278, 391 P.2d at 397, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
12 Id. at 274, 391 P.2d at 396, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5.
's Id. at 278, 391 P.2d at 399, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
"4 Id. at 277, 391 P.2d at 399, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
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independent corroboration by another source. Therefore, the dissent-
ing Justices believed that Inspector Martin acted with probable cause
when he searched McDonald and arrested Reeves.
It is a function of the trial court to appraise and weigh the evi-
dence on the issue of probable cause," and, therefore, the California
Supreme Court in the Reeves case must have found that a lack of
probable cause existed either as a matter of law, or because no rea-
sonable man could find otherwise. The court based its decision on a
failure to corroborate the fact that the law was being violated.
Reeves, therefore, holds that this requirement of corroboration must
be met before the trial court may state that reasonable cause exists
as a matter of law, or as a matter of fact. This requirement appears
to narrow the ground for reasonable cause set forth in Willson v.
Superior Court wherein the court stated:
[E]vidence must be presented to the court that would justify the
conclusion that reliance on the information was reasonable ...
In some cases the identity of, or past experience with, the informer
may provide such evidence .. .and in others it may be supplied
by similar information from other sources or by the personal ob-
servations of the police.'6 (Footnote omitted.)
In People v. Fischer" the court stated that the officer must present
evidence to the court which would justify the conclusion that his
reliance on that information was reasonable. Also, in People v.
Bates,8 Justice Peters, who spoke for the majority in Reeves, stated
the requirement more broadly as: "[T~he reliability of the inform-
ant ... may be substantiated by the proven accuracy of the informa-
tion given by the informant and which the officers from other
sources know is accurate."' 9
The Reeves decision establishes a new requirement, corroboration
of the fact that the law is being violated. The majority also cited
Willson with approval. That case, as well as those in which the in-
formation from an unreliable informer was coupled with the defend-
ant's furtive or suspicious conduct, is within the Reeves requirement.
Such conduct supplies the necessary corroboration that a crime is
being committed.20
Is However, the findings of reasonableness by the trial court are respected only inso-
far as they are consistent with constitutional guarantees. Ker v. California 374
U.S. 23 (1963).
:6 46 Cal. 2d at 294-95, 294 P.2d at 38.
1' 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P.2d 967 (1957) (reliability of source of information not
challenged) (court's finding of reasonable cause to arrest not based solely on
information given officer).
lB 163 Cal. App. 2d 487, 330 P.2d 102 (1958).
'19 Id. at 852, 330 P.2d at 105.
20 See People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956); People v. Davis, 205
Cal. App. 2d 517, 23 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1962); People v. Reyes, 206 Cal. App. 2d
337, 23 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1962).
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However, there are cases wherein probable cause was found to
exist which may no longer meet the Reeves criterion. In People v.
Prieto,"' a warrant was issued on the basis of information supplied
by an untested informer corroborated only by surveillance, prior
burglary convictions, and suspicion of possession of narcotics. There
was no corroboration of the fact that the law was being violated.
The court stated that it could not rule that as a matter of law a
reasonable person confronted by the evidence would not be con-
vinced that probable cause for a search did not exist, and that the
evidence required submission of the issue to the jury. Justice Tob-
riner reviewed facts which in other cases had been found sufficient
to constitute probable cause. These additional corroborative circum-
stances induded: observations of suspicious actions of the defend-
ant, past activities, police surveillance or observation, prior convic-
tion of the suspected offense, or prior addiction.2
The Reeves decision appears to eliminate all but the first of the
above circumstances as sufficient corroborative facts. The majority
dismissed the pre-existing knowledge of Inspector Martin, his per-
sonal contact with Reeves concerning narcotics, and the latter's prior
narcotic record by stating that they were merely corroboration of the
fact that the informer knew the men and was familiar with their
past activities. The court failed to appraise this independent knowl-
edge in conjunction with the statements of the informer in deter-
mining whether or not the police acted reasonably. In light of the
habituating (though not addictive) characteristics of marijuana and
the well known recidivism of 'users,' was it unreasonable for Mar-
tin, after receiving the anonymous phone call and making the in-
vestigation, to believe that Reeves, a prior narcotic offender, would
again be in possession of marijuana? Granted, he could not have
been absolutely certain that the law was being violated. Still, there
were sufficient facts present to allow the trial court to decide whether
or not probable cause existed. A prior conviction of a suspected
crime involving narcotics is a strong indication that the individual
named by an informer might be repeating those acts, and greater
weight should have been accorded this fact. These facts; i.e., the
prior narcotic convictions of both men, the prior contact with Reeves
21 191 Cal. App. 2d 62, 12 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1961). An anonymous woman informed
the police that if they checked a designated phone booth they would find a mari-
juana cigarette. She called a second time to inquire if the cigarette did contain
marijuana. When the police told her that it was in the process of being analyzed,
she said she would call again. Upon her final call, after the police had deternined
that the cigarette contained marijuana, she told them that they would find such
cigarettes in a tissue box in the defendant's bedroom. The police obtained a search
warrant, proceeded to the defendant's home, and arrested him after discovering
the marijuana in a Kleenex box.
22 191 Cal. App. 2d at 69, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
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concerning narcotics, the habituating characteristics of narcotics, and
the recidivism of narcotic offenders should have been considered
corroborative of the informant's statement that a crime was being
committed.2" The existence of probable cause should be evaluated in
lights of what a reasonable police officer would do in the same or
similar circumstances, and not what an appellate court would have
done.
What further action could the police have taken in Reeves to
obtain grounds for reasonable cause? All the information at their
disposal had been verified except that the law was being violated.
That fact could have been corroborated by a reliable informer or
another untested informer.2' Unfortunately, the police did not have
these additional sources. Since, "the magistrate must be satisfied that
'there is probable cause to believe' that grounds for the search
exist,""= a warrant would not have been issued because the police
could not corroborate the fact that the law had been violated. The
alternative would have been to initiate a surveillance in the hope
that the conduct of the men would supply the necessary corrobora-
tion. If the police had been fortunate, they might have obtained
the required corroboration in this fashion. If not, the surveillance
would have either continued ad infinitum, or terminated without an
arrest. The purpose of this survey of the practical aspects of the
enforcement problem is to illustrate the difficulty that the Reeves
requirement presents.
Fundamental principles of jurisprudence dictate that the individ-
ual must be given protection against unreasonable police action. It
is not unreasonable to consider an untested informer an unreliable
source and hold that he cannot gain the status of a reliable informer
until he has proven himself. Nor is it unreasonable to hold that the
information obtained from an unreliable informer alone is an insuf-
ficient basis for probable cause. But the court has overemphasized
23 At this point it might be argued that anything less than the Reeves requirement
would lead to 'rousting" and the fabrication of non-existent informers by the
police. But it is presumed that the police will carry out their official duties in an
honest manner and will not commit perjury. CA.. CoDE CV. PRoc. § 1963 (15),
People v. Garnett, 148 Cal. App. 2d 280, 284, 306 P.2d 571, 574 (1957).
24 People v. Weathers, 162 Cal. App. 2d 545, 328 P.2d 222 (1958).
25 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1525, 1528, Arata v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 2d 767,
773, 315 P.2d 473, 478 (1957).
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corroboration of untested (unreliable) informers.2 " It should not
insist upon standards of corroboration of untested informers which
unnecessarily impede law enforcement. The court should strike a
balance between personal immunity from police interference and
the community's interest in efficient law enforcement. Justice would
be served by eliminating the Reeves requirement and adhering to
the requirements of the Willson, Fischer, and Bates cases. Reason-
ableness should be a question of fact, and the trial courts should, in
the exercise of their sound discretion, determine the weight to be
accorded the information possessed by the officer at the time of
arrest.
Armando L. Odorico
26 E.g., in People v. Cedeno, 218 Cal. App. 2d 213, 32 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1963), an
informer met the police several times concerning persons allegedly dealing in
narcotics. During one meeting she was escorted to the defendant's hotel by the
police who gave her money and sent her into the hotel. She returned with one
marijuana dgarette, and gave it to the police. In another meeting she told the
police that she had been up to the defendant's room, and that there was marijuana
all over the room. The defendant was arrested and at the trial the court held that,
because the informer had not in the past given information leading to valid sus-
pects, she was unreliable, and that the police failed to corroborate any facts. It
was held that there was no reasonable cause to arrest. It would seem that this is
one of the many examples of instances where the community has suffered in an
effort to overinsure that the informer's information was reliable.
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